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Executive Summary

Title: Model Design for Military Advisors

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Thesis: If a disciplined approach to advisor model selection is injected into the process of military foreign advising, then outcomes related to the individual counterpart's developmental needs will be more predictable and specific.

Discussion: When military advisors professionalize the armed forces of an ally they are creating enduring partnerships between nations and advancing our vital interests by giving our allies the ability to contribute to regional stability. A handful of capable US advisors can seed the technical and doctrinal competence of an emerging military so that it can use its own blood and treasure to meet our common interests. While this appears straight forward strategically, at the operational level US experiences in Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan suggests that little attention is given to matching the advisor to the counterpart based on the operational environment and the developmental needs of the counterpart. Instead, training Individual Augmentees (IA) to be advisors has assumed a monolithic counterpart with a very narrow range of developmental needs in a narrow operational environment. It is no surprise then that outside of US Special Forces training elite host nation forces where the deck is somewhat stacked, military advising using US IAs has had limited success in providing specific developmental results in counterparts and broad operational results in regular forces. Military advisors need to understand that counterparts have specific development needs in learning new complex skills. Advisors will benefit from a model to frame their approach to the counterpart's developmental needs. Three dominate models have emerged from successful efforts over the last half century in this regard; the Stoic Acquaintance, the General Manager, and the Entertainer.

Conclusion: If advisors are given a model to frame their approach to the developmental needs of their counterpart and the operational needs of the environment, results will be more specific and predictable.

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Preface

This topic was selected following two individual augmentee (IA) deployments advising the Afghan National Army; once in 2004 to Kabul to work with the ANA Office of the Surgeon General and again in 2010 to Helmand Province to advise the ANA 215 Corps Surgeon. Before the first deployment, there was no training provided before reaching Afghanistan. In 2010, the pre-deployment phase was mostly focused on convoy procedures, weapons training, battlefield medicine, and site exploitation. Cultural and language training was limited and instruction on how to be an advisor or mentor was non-existent. In both cases, ethnic identification was more about understanding allegiances than it was about understanding cultural and education nuances. In general, all Afghans were assumed to be in a similar state of individual cognitive development and what was expected from the advisor relationship was always vague beyond simply not alienating the Afghans. There was no discussion during pre-deployment on how an advisor meets the learning needs of their counterpart.

This paper explores one area that would significantly improve advising outcomes; using advising models to match the strengths of the advisor with the developmental needs of the counterpart. In the future, if the pre-deployment phase for an IA is more focused on matching an advisor model to a counterpart and developing the advisor as one who understands the developmental needs of his counterpart, results will be more specific. This paper develops three dominate models for advisors; the Stoic Acquaintance, the General Manger, and the Entertainer which can be applied to meet specific operational and developmental needs.

Introduction

Strategic thinking stresses the influence of moral forces and human nature in waging war and building peace. Military planners struggle with the immovable aspects of human nature that undermine the feasibility of doctrinal approaches which might appear brilliant and obvious in the vacuum of inexperience. In the last hundred years this incongruity, between abstract doctrine and the realities of human nature, has been present in the deployment of US military advisors to Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, and Afghanistan. Fundamentally, when military advisors professionalize the armed forces of an ally, they are creating enduring partnerships between nations and advancing our vital interests by giving our allies the ability to create regional stability. In theory, a handful of capable US advisors can seed the technical and doctrinal competence of an emerging military so that it can use its own blood and treasure to meet our common interests. In this way, the US does not have to deploy large forces to every contentious area of the world. As a brief history of military advisers from the *Economist* stated, “a military advisor’s pencil can be easily sharpened into the tip of a broader campaign’s spear.”¹ While this appears straight forward, US experiences in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan suggests that the ability of military advising to advance these strategic goals is limited by the realities of human nature. Many authors have written on the soundness of advising approaches as viewed through the lens of human nature. Specifically, much has been written about the importance of cultural sensitivity, language skills, experience levels, leadership principles, technical skills, team building, and building rapport in the advisor role. However, a surprising area omitted from nearly all the literature on military advising is matching an advisor to a framework to approach his efforts to meet the

learning needs of his counterpart. This is in spite of the inherently educational nature of the relationship between the advisor and the counterpart. In addition, there is very little in the literature on how to train advisors on how to teach and breakdown barriers to learning. Various theories related to learning suggest that advisors should focus on developing higher order skills through the use of a supportive environment where a student can tolerate the cognitive load necessary to unpack complex tasks and learn from them.² Fundamental to the learning process is uncovering sources of resistance or frustration and preventing these dynamics from being obstacles to learning.³ Mastery of skills will occur when a student has the opportunity to observe, unpack, practice, and analyze tasks. It is also important to examine past learning and see if the assumptions are valid to the context.⁴

A solid advisor framework and model will match the needs of the counterpart with a particular style of instruction and instructor. The literature on military advisors is full of attempts to understand the culture of a counterpart but very little work has been done to consider how each counterpart learns. Other than generic guidance on the customs of the counterpart's culture, very little is written about how to establish a learning rapport with a counterpart. It is also interesting that interviews with advisors from Asian, Muslim, and Christian parts of the world show incredible similarities in the problems they faced in learning new skills⁵. These difficulties are often attributed to cultural issues but since the Korean War, advisors have received at least a minimum of cultural training before deployment. Still, both sides often report difficulties connecting as advisors and counterparts. It is automatically assumed that the failure is one related to cultural misunderstandings. However, what might better explain military advisors not

being able to connect with counterparts frequently over the last sixty years is a failure to understand learning needs within a cultural setting. As such, advisors should understand the cognitive dynamics of human nature and become familiar with potential models that can facilitate their strengths while meeting the individual developmental needs of the counterpart.

The literature on military advising is thin on providing specific results for unique circumstances. Instead, advisors over the last sixty year have been given very narrow goals assuming a very general cultural image that does not factor in the individual counterpart's learning needs. In short, common sense suggests that teachers must be taught the art of teaching but advisor training over the last 60 years has not done so. Very little attention has been given to designing a framework from which an advisor can coordinate his personality, operational variation, and the specific developmental requirements of the counterpart. With a more intentional approach to advisor model design an advisor can balance key considerations to avoid an ineffective outcome or one that is too general. Factors that would go well into an advisor model matrix include requirements of each operational environment, training requirements for the advisor, the essential requirements of each approach, the essential capability of each approach, the vulnerability of each approach, and the individual development needs of the counterpart. This will help ensure a match between advisor and counterpart. The experience of advisors in Vietnam suggests that a large contributor to failure was not matching the right personality to the operational environment.⁶

The possible combination of all the above factors into an advising approach is vast but three dominate models emerge from the literature concerning Korea, Vietnam, El

Salvador, and Afghanistan. These models can be categorized as the Stoic Acquaintance, the General Manager, and the Entertainer. Most advisors will gravitate toward a specific model where their distinct personality traits and cognitive strengths will be matched. Each model differs in approach to human nature, leadership issues, cultural issues, and educational issues. A key to avoiding failure is matching the advisor model to the operational environment, the needs of the counterpart, and the strengths of the advisor. If a disciplined approach to advisor model selection is injected into the process of military foreign advising, then outcomes related to the individual counterpart's developmental needs will be more predictable and specific.

This paper will focus only on advisor model selection. It does not focus on the larger issue whether strategic ends have been met in past or current advising efforts. Nor will it judge the overall failure or success of advising in these efforts on the tactical level. Instead it will only suggest that when a specific model is used, the operational results are more specific and matched to the developmental needs of the counterpart.

Stoic Acquaintance Model:

Overview:

The Stoic Acquaintance is a frequently selected model for advisors. It is characterized by a lack of emotional and personal investment by the advisor. In such a relationship, the advisor has little personal or intellectual investment in the relationship and takes little responsibility for the success or failure of the counterpart. However, he is always professional and available to the counterpart for both public and private gatherings. When asked for technical advice, the advisor gives it readily but only to his counterpart. He actively resists any effort by his counterpart to place him in a leadership

role. The Stoic Acquaintance also resists any efforts from the counterpart for favors or resources. The Stoic Acquaintance and counterpart rarely share meals or details of their personal life. This model embodies a purely professional and technical relationship.

Essential Requirements of the Model:

An essential requirement for this model is an honest and interested counterpart. As occurred in US military advising during the Korean War, young Korean officers and service members had a deep patriotic and personal investment in their military career.⁷ The Stoic Acquaintance model had advantages because in the Korean context it avoided the complications of personalities and/or political considerations. In Korea, if an advisor purely wanted to give advice, avoid leadership, and keep the relationship focused on the technical aspects of war, this model was a good fit. If the Korean counterpart was satisfied with only gaining technical advice without any benefits of friendship or cultural exchange, it was a good fit. A US advisor in Korea taking this approach needed only his military expertise and an interpreter to accomplish his goals. Cultural and language training requirements were minimal. The impetus for learning was on the counterpart to extract what he wanted from the advisor.

Vulnerability of the Model:

The vulnerabilities of this model are that it ignores advising as a means to establish lasting personal relationships based on trust, its inherent aloofness can be interpreted as conceit, and the purely technical nature of the advice misses the opportunity to develop higher order cognitive skills in the counterpart. As was the case in Vietnam, advisors worked hard to avoid the “tactical robot” phenomena which this model can produce.⁸ Instead, they saw the importance of being ambassadors of

American goodwill and respect. The Stoic Acquaintance model does little to exchange culturally and develop relationships. Also, after action reports following advising efforts in Korea suggest that the “the lack of empathy as the most basic problem” between advisors and counter parts.⁹ This suggests that being a Stoic Acquaintance not only causes problems but is the heart of the problem when it comes to advising.

What is particularly dangerous about this framework is that in the unsupported learning environment created by the Stoic Acquaintance model the counterpart might reject both doctrinal and tactical content of the advisor and the advisor himself. The opportunity to build doctrinal uniformity or basic tactical proficiency can be lost. If the counterpart continues to underperform without a shaped learning environment, his frustration will lead to an erosion of trust and rapport. As advisors from Korea found, advising required an “imaginative use of interpersonal quid pro quo to reconcile differences and establish balance.”¹⁴ Without this balance, it is unlikely that resistance to learning will be overcome in the counterpart.

In a counterinsurgency fight where the counterparts being trained are often on the fence in terms of supporting the mission, this model is inherently weak and can contribute to counterparts acting out or changing sides. As was the case in with Afghan National Police, the stoic approach used by advisors was unable to motivate the Afghans to improve their own security situation.¹⁵ As the overall strategic goal is to enable the Afghans to provide their own security, if the approach to advising results in levels of resistance so extreme that it interferes not only with the development of the counterpart but the strategic end state, it should be reconsidered.

Advantage of the Model:

The essential advantage of the stoic acquaintance is the ability to establish clear boundaries in situations where corruption is present or when the tap of US resources, for things such as travel, is no longer available. It also allows for deployment of advisors with little to no advisor training in a short time frame. The US can be seen by the host nation as responding quickly to their circumstances and providing the fundamental skills required for waging war. In circumstances where the host nation has the potential economy to provide its own resources, it provides a cost effective means to establish the basic skills needed for fundamental security in the region.

Selection Criteria for the Model:

Selection of the Stoic Advisor model, assumes that the means exists within the foreign military to provide natural leaders to be advised because this model does not tackle the art of leadership or focus on character. It assumes that counterparts are motivated and willing to consider the guidance of their advisors without the need for graft or personal favors. Also, selection of the model assumes that the counterpart is inexperienced in combat and needs basic technical skills. If any of these assumptions are not valid, the relationship is most likely going to be an empty experience with little progress being made. For example, in Afghanistan where corruption is endemic, combat experience is prevalent, and personal relationships are highly prized, the Stoic Acquaintance model was of poor choice.¹⁰

Approach to Counterpart's Development:

In any advising role, it is crucial to shape a supportive environment so the counterpart knows what to expect from the relationship. Of course, there are countless factors that might be out of the control of the advisor but the Stoic Acquaintance takes a

very disinterested role in attempting to shape a supportive environment. The approach preconditions a counterpart to be defiant if they value their job but feel unsupported. Also, counterparts might experience a sense of hopelessness toward the relationship if they keep attempting to build a relation of trust, support, and rapport but the advisor keeps the relationship confined simply to dispensing encyclopedic information. They might feel they have been assigned a “tactical robot” thus reinforcing feelings of alienation.¹¹ The experience of advisors in Korea suggests that “a counterpart wants an advisor who will support them in a wide variety of ways.”¹²

In an unsupported educational environment, as would be inherent in this advisor model, the well-intended counterpart might not have the experience to unpack complex tasks with enough sophistication to ask the right questions.¹³ Also, the “cognitive load” and emotional investment necessary to “unpack” complex tasks and learn from them is taxing enough when there is genuine trust and support between student and teacher. It is therefore unrealistic to expect a struggling counterpart to make such an effort in the presence of a detached and one dimensional advisor.

Historical Considerations:

As was found in the case of Vietnam, the actions or lack of action on the part of the advisor can be a source of dissatisfaction not only with him but with the US.¹⁶ It should be noted that this is the advising model most advisor programs seem to train toward. This model takes its lead from the words like those of T.E. Lawrence from his influential work *Twenty Seven Articles* where he says: “Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed. Do not be too intimate, too prominent, or too earnest”; “Keep always on your guard; never say an unnecessary thing; watch yourself and your

companions all the time”; and “Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly.”¹⁷ The American military adaptation of his principles is to be an expert without being intimate, hands on, or trusting. However, it is important to remember that his advice is about fighting with the Arabs and not advising them on how to fight. He was not trying to build an allied army that could defend a region in pursuit of a long term common goals. He was only giving advice, to other Englishmen, on how to fight side by side with the Arabs as allies. This is a wildly different task than advising and it is very culturally dependent. Yet, his work is quoted frequently in the advising literature and his principles are evident in the Stoic Acquaintance model of advising.

Still, the Stoic Acquaintance role worked for Lawrence because his designed approach was a solid match to the particular operational and the developmental needs of his counterparts who, frankly, had raids and guerrilla tactics perfected before Lawrence, a young archeologist, arrived. His well-deserved success, however, has given many who develop advisor training the impression that his approach to fighting side by side with Arabs is a good model for military advising. Unfortunately developing higher order skills is more about unpacking complex military tasks and moving counterparts to higher order thinking. As good as his advice was, it was very context specific and had no real links to the learning or developmental needs of a junior or field grade counterpart. Still, many in the military expect his approach to work when advising militaries in developing nations. They appreciate its light footprint, historical connections, and simplicity.

Summary of the Model:

Often, when Stoic Advisors quietly accompany their counterparts to local meetings with elders or to meet with elements of a resistance they are assumed to be successful when the counterparts win the discussion without any assistance from the advisors. What is more likely is that simply by being present, the advisors are having an effect on the meeting's outcome by being as a silent but powerful symbol of American power

There are environments, obviously, where a Stoic Acquaintance model will work to produce results like Lawrence but it is also the case, perhaps more often, when this model cannot be applied when there are deeper developmental needs on the part of the counterpart. Any pre-deployment training that relies on this mentality would be preparing advisors for a very narrow set of circumstances. The Stoic Acquaintance model will do very little to prepare a counterpart to improve mastery at complex tasks or tolerate the stress of uncertainty. If the advisor is in an environment where the demand from leadership is for results but their desired model is for a Stoic Acquaintance, he is in a dilemma that could lead to non-specific result, superficiality, and failure. Practically, these advisors can fall into the category of "eye candy" where they simply sit quietly with their counterparts or follow them at a respectful distance with very little true advising taking place.

General Manager Advisor Model:

Overview:

The General Manager model seeks to leverage the expertise of the advisor but retains the counterpart firmly in a leadership role. The greatest difference with this model compared with the Stoic Acquaintance is that the General Manager goes beyond

simply advising on the technical aspects of war and takes a personal investment in the success of his counterpart. Often the General Manager is behind the scenes making things happen but with careful attention to not undermine the authority of the counterpart.

Essential Requirement of the Model:

An essential requirement for this model is a culturally aware officer who understands that staffs and operations are highly dependent on intangibles that go well beyond the purely technical aspects of war. Making things happen in any military requires concentrated attention to complexity which the General Manager aids his counterpart in tracking. As such, it requires advisors that are highly capable and risk takers. It requires advisors with the ability to engender trust with their counterpart. The General Manager requires an enormous amount of access to the counterpart to allow the advisor to take such a central role in moving operations along.

Vulnerability of the Model:

A vulnerability of this model is that once the general manager redeploys, the pace of operations could be drastically interrupted. If the advisor is behind the scenes tracking all the details with the counterpart, it could create a crutch for the counterpart who only appears to be tracking the details. Once the advisor leaves, the details are no longer tracked with the right amount of attention and things fall apart. Also, if the counterpart concedes the behind the scenes work to the advisor; he becomes an empty leader without the basic skills to carry out operations.

In the case of Afghanistan, there was serious concern that dependency was being created by stifling of leadership in the Afghan National Army.¹⁸ The full strain of leadership cannot properly be experienced without the weight of administration on the

officer. If the advisor is the only one who can answer the hard questions and function independently in a complex and uncertain environment, the leadership skills of the counterpart will be empty and stifled. Unfortunately, this model risks the advisor becoming a personal assistant or unofficial chief of staff to the counterpart. Crucial to any advising model is creating an independent counterpart even if means that the success will be slowed.¹⁹ If the counterpart is a natural leader, this model can mask his shortcomings in terms of managing the complexity of military operations..

Advantages of the Model:

A key capability in this model is the ability to quickly provide competent management of the complex military operations. This shows the host nation the commitment of the US to their success and the counterparts can appreciate the personal investments advisors make in their development. This can solidify deep relationships between officers and nations. In terms of corruption, the general manager model places a serious barrier to systems being exploited for personal gain. While the stoic acquaintance certainly avoids US advisors participating in corruption, it does nothing to create obstacles for corruption. As the general manager is tracking the details, this creates transparency to bring assurances that corruption is actively avoided. The transparency can also allow for more efficient hand overs when advising duties rotate to a new team.

Selection Criteria for the Model:

On a day to day basis, the General Manager advisor must be capable of working behind the scenes on complex tasks, walking the counterpart through logistical planning, drafting policy memos, building calendars, and accompanying the counterpart to meetings showing confidence in his leadership but never speaking for him without

invitation. The advisor must be capable of modeling the desired behaviors and roles that build a professional military. As was found in the 1980's in El Salvador, advisors were giving their counterparts "an understanding of the proper role of military force obedient to a civilian government."²⁰ This level of sophistication requires an officer with intensity, technical skills, trust, and leadership. A simply social or encyclopedic relationship is unlikely result in producing an advisor capable of such complexity. Instead, the General Manager model requires the ability to bring a wealth of professional expertise to the relationships and the ability to make a personal investment in the success of his counterpart.

Approach to Counterpart's Development:

The general manager works very hard to create a supportive environment that builds trust and dialogue so that the counterpart will be willing to endure the cognitive load of unpacking tasks. Unpacking tasks is the best way to help a counterpart understand the underlying complexity of a military and leadership task. As mentors in Vietnam found, "most benefits were the result of building trust; we immersed ourselves into the organization and culture."²¹ An important advantage of the General Manager model is that the counterpart can observe a trusted advisor in doing a complicated task. In this way he can understand the situation enough that he can begin to ask the right questions. Also, the advisor can inject information at crucial points to reinforce learning.

The General Manager is in an ideal situation to activate prior learning, address gaps in learning knowledge, avoid application of prior knowledge during improper contexts, and help counterparts rethink inaccurate understandings.²² It is unlikely that

counterparts will tolerate such intense reflection, even if it is spaced out to meet the intellectual and cultural needs of the counterpart, if there is a lack of a supportive environment. It is more likely to result in rejection or defiance if there is no support. Instead, the supportive environment created by the General Manager is more likely to result in motivation in strong counterparts and, albeit fragile, a more hopeful mindset in weaker counterparts.

Mastery of military skills comes from acquiring skills, practicing integrating them, and knowing when to apply them.²³ The general manager model aids a counterpart through this process by being actively involved enough that the counterpart can learn from observation without overshadowing their initiative. Unpacking the complexity of military leadership will not occur through a few carefully chosen questions but through a constant and supportive dialog where the countless nodes of a process are examined and understood. Whereas the Stoic Advisor role is focused upon providing memorized answers to generic military tasks, the general manager shapes the environment to facilitate learning and higher order skills development. In Vietnam, this style of approach seemed to work successfully because the advisors' tendency to immerse themselves in the culture of their counterparts resulted in intense side by side relationships where the smallest of military tasks was dissected and used as an opportunity for greater understanding.²⁴ As General Zinni said about his experience as an advisor in Vietnam, "I saw the war through the eyes of the Vietnam people."²⁵ When the honest evaluations of the counterparts were expressed in a demanding yet equally supportive environments, they built trust. However, if the advisor was seen as aloof and

kept the relationship focused only upon providing expertise, trust was not achieved and animosity was built.

While the general manager model can risk building a dependent counterpart or a counterpart who has been denied full the full weight of his responsibility, it does provide a strong ideal learning environment because of its ability to create the support needed to endure the cognitive load of unpacking complex situations. The strength of the model can be seen in its application in Vietnam where advisors were able to create greater security in their areas of responsibility, strong officers, and deep trust. The unpacking of complex tasks allowed the advising to go beyond the technical and mundane situations. It allowed the advisors and counterparts to become better at the art of leaderships and the intangibles of command that a simple question and answer relationship cannot provide. In the best cases, the supportive relationship of the General Manager also allowed for exploration of moral issues.

Ethical Development within the Counterpart:

It is also the case that during Vietnam, there was a focus on how counterparts made decisions of a non-technical or moral nature. By directing the advisors to incorporate the counterpart's sensitivities, perceptions, and attitudes in moral and ethical contexts, they were able to push them toward acquiring higher order skills in the area decision making.²⁶ While they did not call it unpacking, clearly they were examining prior experiences and knowledge in the hopes of building higher order skills. If future pre-deployment training is more formalize in this area, future results will be more specific in developing the moral and ethical leadership skills in the individual counterpart.

Cultural Considerations and the Model:

It is a great misnomer that with a dozen lectures or a few hundred pages of reading during pre-deployment that an advisor can be an expert in a culture and truly understand it. Even within cultures, there are nuances and subcultures that make most training a mere approximation. One significant means by which to have a practical expert in culture is through the General Manager approach. Just as the counterpart starts to unpack the complexity of military operations with the advisor, so the advisor starts to unpack the complexity of culture with the counterpart in ways that books and lectures could never achieve. While the average advisor might lack the sophistication to articulate his cultural understanding in a manner appropriate for publication, the intensity and structure of the General Manager model creates it at least intuitively. An advisor that has taken the development of his counterpart seriously will benefit from the quid pro quo of having a practical and visceral exchange with the culture in which he immersed himself. Advisors in Korea found that an officer becomes an advisor when “he displays an interest in becoming knowledgeable about the counterparts language, history, economy, customs, and feeling of the people with whom he is interacting.”²⁷

Special Forces Similarities to the Model:

It is frequent when experts look for success in military advising to note the outstanding work done by the Special Forces community to build capable host nation units. The Special Forces model uses attention to detail and a close working relationship with the counterpart in a manner that is similar to that found in the General Manager model. The only complicating factor when looking at the Special Forces community is that there is an element of self-selection in their process. The Special Forces community

selects elite counterparts who have a similar learning style as their own. This makes needing to learn a variety of teaching approaches less important. Even still, the key to the Special Forces approach is that it dedicates a great amount of time to shaping the learning environment to meet the cognitive needs of the counterparts. It helps that the Special Forces community selects counterparts who had similar developmental needs compared to what they needed when they were learning.

Summary of the Model:

The operational environment and the development needs of the counterpart often demands results that can only be achieved with a General Manager model. If the dangers of creating dependence can be avoided, this model acts in good faith to develop the specific developmental need of a counterpart. It cannot, however, occur on its own. It requires an advisor who is a subject matter expert in his field and has been taught the art of teaching or, as is in the case of the Special Forces community, has the freedom to select elite counterparts with very narrow and homogeneous learning needs. If the chain of command wants this kind of advisor in the future, preparing the officer will be a lengthy process and will require careful matching of advisor and counterpart. It is unlikely that the present practice of using rapidly trained individual augments to simply plug holes will facilitate the General Manager model.

The Entertainer Advisor Model:

Overview:

The Entertainer advisor model is characterized by a relationship that exists almost completely upon rapport. It should be noted that rapport and trust are not the same thing. The approach makes only a small effort to instruct the counterpart or develop a

relationship with the counterpart beyond the superficial. Instead, through socialization and favors the advisor keeps the counterpart invested in the behaviors of professional networking. It is highly possible that this is the most frequent model for advisors because it is the easiest way to generate visible compliance and results.

The Entertainer approach, if done well, requires a great deal of time and the counterpart has to be motivated to at least attend the events planned by the entertainer. In practical terms this might manifest itself in arranging frequent trips and meetings for tea or meals with influential power brokers in the counterpart's military structure. In such meetings, little advising is done other than entertainment and drawing the counterpart into the circle of power brokers. Obviously, this has advantages but if the counterpart lacks crucial military skills, his ability to function in such circles will be limited. Still, rapport and being an informal diplomat are legitimately important aspects of being an advisor and the Entertainer model is an efficient means to achieve those ends.

Essential Requirements of the Model:

Of all the roles, this one requires the deepest understanding of culture. Given that the relationship is based entirely upon rapport, there is no professional common ground that the two can fall back to if there is a misunderstanding. The relationship is unapologetically superficial and therefore unavoidably fragile. Additionally, as the relationship is based almost entirely upon social events, understanding the customs of these events is critical to success. This requires leveraging cultural factors to achieve success. Training during pre-deployment is critical because it is unlikely that an honest understanding of the counterpart's culture will develop over time through professional quid pro quo. When the relationship is based on professional development, as is the case

in other models, the counterpart might tolerate a formative period for the advisor to understand his cultural nuances. However, if the relationship is based entirely upon coordinating social interactions, the counterpart might very well expect the entertainer to be fully versed in the counterpart's customs.

Other than intense cultural training, the Entertainer requires very little technical education. It is possible that an officer outside the MOS of the counterpart could be an advisor. As moving through the political and bureaucratic landscape can be complex, education on the host nation's military and government is necessary if he hopes to navigate his counterpart through its political realities. With that in mind, this model requires the least amount of military specialization but an intense amount of classroom work to understand the culture and customs of the counterpart before deployment.

The Entertainer model requires freedom of movement for the advisor. If the advisor can't arrange travel to various events or can't gain access to key power brokers, the advisor will have a very limited effect. In addition, the Entertainer must have a large amount of support and access to his own chain of command to facilitate these events. The Stoic Acquaintance and General Manager models can function relatively independently. In contrast, the Entertainer is not driving toward a similar level of independence and prioritizes developing social and political skills in the counterpart. As such, he cannot realistically meet specific goals without providing significant levels of support.

Vulnerabilities of the Model:

Unfortunately, this model is vulnerable to failure if the counterpart truly wants a meaningful professional relationship. It is not uncommon for advising to be a part-time

role for some US HQ officers and as such the advisor often chooses an Entertainer model to conserve his energy while giving the outward appearance of success by keeping the relationship amicable. However, such application of the model lacks the time required to make it work effectively. As such, the relationship does not progress past meals, tea, and procedural meetings because of the time restraints and stamina of the advisor. In this regard, patronizing a counterpart with superficial questions while waiting on a C-130 or stopping by for tea gives the counterpart the impression they are not a priority regardless how entertaining the interactions might be. This can lead to resentment and feeling cheated. It also sends the signal that the counterpart is not deserving of true professional development in the eyes of the advisor. During Korea, advisors found that rapport was hard won and easily lost.²⁸ If the rapport is not complimented with trust and a resilient relationship, it is especially fragile.

Maintaining the counterpart's leadership skills are also seriously at risk in the Entertainer model. While the counterpart is building political bridges and being introduced to key stake holders, his command may become hallow. The visibility of the counterpart starts to be equated with combat effectiveness. However, it could be that the lack of focus on the internal aspects of his unit starts to erode his command. The ability to keep his unit cohesive and with the will to fight, is not inherent nor does it happen automatically. It requires constant attention and can easily degrade with even the shortest period of neglect. The Entertainer model can invite this risk. In fact, during Vietnam advisors found that when counterparts spent too much time in politics and or the politics of the military structure, their units experienced a concerning level of instability.²⁹

Selection Criteria for the Model:

The Entertainer requires a very specific gregarious personality. If the chain of command wants an entertainer model used for a specific counterpart, using the wrong personality would be detrimental. In those instances where it is operationally important to have a skilled and independent counterpart increase his face to face interactions with other key stakeholders, the entertainer model can be used to persuade the counterpart to reach out more socially and politically. Being gregarious is not a personality trait all people have. So, if the chain of command has the choice between a seasoned doctrinally sound officer and a gregarious officer with little experience, the social officer makes more sense if the right conditions apply.

The model also assumes that the basic technical and managerial skills required to run a military organization are already present in the counterpart or in rare occasions unnecessary. It assumes that the counterpart needs the finishing touches of learning to maneuver through the social and political landscape of his military hierarchy. It assumes that despite these skills not being fully natural for the counterpart, that he has other military attributes that make him worth the investment.

Ethical Considerations of the Model:

A possible capability of this model is that it gives the ability to inject honest and capable officers into corrupt systems. In many cases, talented and honest military officers are outsiders in dishonest systems and are banished to their assignments to do the heavy lifting of day to day activities. The Entertainer model can facilitate into the circles of power a flood of honest men with the technical and leadership skills to run a host nation's military with both efficiency and integrity.

The model does not however make an investment in an instructive dialogue between the counterpart and advisor to improve moral decision making and ethical behavior. The model assumes that the skills are already present or, most disappointingly, are not needed for the counterpart to be successful in the operational environment.

As stated above, if done properly, the model can be a barrier to corruption. However, if is done poorly, corruption is perhaps the greatest weakness of this approach. The Stoic Advisor counters corruption by being aloof from it. The General Manager counters corruption by being on top of every detail. However, the Entertainer is focused on increasing a counterpart's influence and influence is a primary tool of corruption. In an attempt to increase a counterpart's influence by introducing him to other counterparts, the advisor could inadvertently build a system with the potential for corruption. Even though the philosophy is to stop corruption by filling the hierarchy with honest men, the approach has very few mechanisms to ensure the advisor knows the counterpart is honest given that he is not heavily involved in the daily details of counterpart's administrative practices.

Cognitive Development of Counterpart:

Training of the counterpart is not a key priority for the Entertainer model. Of all the models, this one is the least interested in the cognitive development of the counterpart and as such teaching the teacher to teach is of little utility. Again, the assumption is that the counterpart is either competent in terms of technical skill or those skills are irrelevant. However, while the Entertainer model may flood the host nation military with a networked collection of reasonably honest leaders, it will fail to reinforce unity of effort in approach. Doctrine and practice could begin to vary wildly from command to

command. In the future this could make coordination of any combined effort difficult for the counterparts if each command has developed its own system. The Entertainer model makes a dangerous assumption that the counterpart's doctrinal and technical approaches works and do not need be improved. It is more often the case that advisors using other models, such as the General Manager, are building a common set of practices in accordance with doctrine as much as they are building simple individual competence. Otherwise, variation from command to command can make individual excellence in management irrelevant because it cannot synchronize with adjoining units. So, while the Entertainer model does not make the investment in time to unpack complex tasks, it also fails to build counterparts that can function with common doctrine and coordinate with others during complicated planning.

Summary of the Model:

The Entertainer is the easiest model to deploy. It takes few risks and provides few challenges to the counterpart. It has the potential to establish rapid rapport. It can easily become a safety net when the advisor feels the Stoic Acquaintance or the General Manager models are incompatible with the personality of the counterpart. In fact, with so much of the advisor's success being equated to his rapport with the counterpart, the Entertainer model becomes the safest approach if the advisor is concerned about promotion. During Vietnam, the Secretary of Defense McNamara made it clear when he said that it was "beyond price to make friends with these people" that the advisors were to form lasting relationships with the officers who would lead and guide Vietnam in the future.³⁰ The Entertainer model is not a copout in this regard but a good faith approach to give a highly specific and predictable outcome.

Certain Afghan units without advisors outperformed advised units.³¹ However, while they excelled at combat, they were weak when it came to coordinating with Kabul. In such circumstances where the counterpart's combat efficiency is established, where resistance to advising is high, where the counterpart would benefit from greater political networking, and where the social skills of the advisor are strong, the entertainer offers the best approach.

Conclusion

The history of US military advisers suggests that they are often trained to function as Stoic Acquaintances, that they are expected to have the operational results of the General Manager, but they tend to resort to the Entertainer model in practice because alienating the counterpart is so often equated with failure. Part of the issue is that success and failure have been defined as though there is one set of learning needs in the counterparts and one type of military advisor. The reality is that without a full evaluation of the development needs of the counterpart and without an effort to make a complimentary match, definitions of success and failure will lack any meaningful specificity.

In the past, disappointing results in advising experiences have been blamed on cultural and language differences. While some cultures have a very low tolerance for infractions, the experiences of advisors suggests that when they have a solid quid pro quo relationship the counterparts are more willing to forgive mistakes. Advisors can overcome small social missteps not because they had twelve lectures on local customs during pre-deployment training but because they are able to understand the deeper human nature of the counterpart.

The heart of a resilient advisor and counterpart relationship comes not just from understanding the counterpart's culture but also his ability to tolerate cognitive stress and in due course his humanity as well. Obviously, cultural training is important and it can help avoid mistakes but it is not the load bearing wall most pre-deployment training makes it out to be. It is an important tool but it does not provide a comprehensive framework for advising. With that in mind, a deliberate application of an advisor model provides the framework to build an advising relationship that can give specific operational results, address resistance, and build lasting rapport. There is no full description of a learning theory in the training literature for military advisors but elements of addressing the cognitive development of the counterpart are present in successful advising experiences in Afghanistan, Vietnam, El Salvador, and Korea. As such, incorporating skills in advisors to address the development needs of their counterparts is evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

When the operational requirements of the environment and the developmental needs of the counterpart are understood, the advisor designs his approach balancing these factors with his own strengths and weaknesses. In conversation with his chain of command the advisor selects one of the three dominate models to approach the advising relationship to increases the possibility of specificity and predictability in the outcome. For example, if one sees a need for greater proficiency in logistics and accountability in the counterpart, the advisor may select the general manager model if his own attributes fit this approach. In nearly all pre-deployment experiences, designing an advisor model to meet the specifics of the environment is absent. The ideal advisor should have extensive experience in his area, formal training in how to educate adults, extensive time in

instructor billets, and a flexible personality. The investment of our nation in advising is too substantial to settle for the generic results of previous approaches that only partially understood learning needs of the counterpart within the operational environment.

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